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Thoughtful Practitioners and an
Engaged Legal Community: The Impact
of the Teaching of Procedure on the
Legal Profession and on Civil Justice
Reform
JANET WALKER, ANDREW HIGGINS, THOMAS D. ROWE JR.,
CARLA CRIFÒ, LORNE SOSSIN & DAVID BAMFORD *
What difference does the teaching of civil procedure as an academic subject make to the
practice of law, to the professional community in which lawyers practice, and to civil justice
reform? In this article, proceduralists from Canada, England and Wales, the United States
and Australia analyze the broader implications of teaching civil procedure as an integral
feature of an academic legal education rather than as a part of vocational training. They
consider ways in which the approach taken to the teaching of procedure in their legal system
has influenced the evolution of the profession during a decade of increased public interest in
the civil justice system and has had an impact on the approach taken to civil justice reform.
En quoi l’enseignement de la procédure civile comme matière théorique modifie-t-il la
pratique du droit, la profession d’avocat et la réforme du système de justice civil? Dans
cet article, des spécialistes canadiens, britanniques, gallois, américains et australiens de
la procédure analysent dans leurs grandes lignes les répercussions qu’a entraîné dans leur
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pays le choix d’enseigner la procédure civile dans le cadre des études juridiques plutôt que
dans celui de la formation professionnelle. Ils examinent la façon dont l’approche adoptée pour
l’enseignement de la procédure civile dans leur pays a influencé l’évolution de la profession au
cours d’une décennie où l’opinion publique a manifesté un intérêt accru envers les tribunaux
civils et influencé l’approche adoptée pour réviser le système de justice civile.
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WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES THE TEACHING of civil procedure as an academic subject

make to the practice of law, to the professional community in which lawyers practice,
and to civil justice reform? In this article, we analyze the broader implications of
opting to teach civil procedure as an integral feature of an academic legal education
rather than as a part of vocational training.
In previous articles in this issue,1 we described the spectrum of approaches to
the teaching of procedure across common law systems, focussing in particular on
1.

Knutsen et al, “The Teaching of Procedure Across Common Law Systems” (2013) 51:1
Osgoode Hall LJ 1; Bamford et al, “Learning the ‘How’ of the Law: Teaching Procedure
and Legal Education” (2013) 51:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 45; Thornburg et al, “A Community of
Procedure Scholars: Teaching Procedure and the Legal Academy” (2013) 51:1 Osgoode Hall
LJ 93.
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the experience in Canada, the United States, England and Wales, and Australia. To
provide context for the current placement of the subject, we compared its history
in each system and surveyed the various perspectives on instructors, educational
materials, and the stage at which students are expected to study the subject. We
then examined the implications of the different approaches taken to the subject
on the rest of the curriculum in legal education and on fostering and maintaining
a community of scholars specializing in civil procedure.
In this article, we venture beyond the academic community to the legal
profession and to questions of civil justice reform. Bearing in mind the different
approaches taken to teaching procedure, we examine the broad contours of the
profession in each of the four jurisdictions mentioned above in order to identify
possible links between the different approaches that those countries take to civil
justice reform.
In Part I we explore the impact of the study of procedure on the practice of
law and the state of the profession. Does it make a difference if all members of
the profession have studied procedure and have done so as an academic subject?
Alternatively, does learning the rules primarily for the purpose of practising law
affect the approach taken to the way these rules are used in one’s practice? For
example, all lawyers are expected to provide their clients with a range of options for
dispute resolution. However, is the range of options for resolving disputes offered by
lawyers who have studied procedure only in a practical training program likely to be
narrower than that offered by those who studied procedure and dispute resolution
first when they were law students? What effects, if any, in the approach taken to
professionalism and ethics may be traced to having first learned these subjects in
an academic environment? What vision of the professional community is fostered
by the various approaches taken to the teaching of procedure?
In Part II we explore the impact of the teaching of procedure on civil justice
reform. How is civil justice reform affected by being pursued within a legal
community whose members’ understanding of procedure has been informed
either by early academic study or by subsequent vocational training? How does the
varying nature and extent of the understanding of procedure within a community
affect the composition of the participants in civil justice reform and their approaches
to it? Does a community’s understanding of procedure engage the profession as
a whole and the wider public? Is it pursued as a continuous or episodic exercise?
What advantages (or obstacles) to civil justice reform arise from the presence or
lack of a broad understanding in the larger legal community of basic procedure
and the way in which civil justice is administered?

158

(2013) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

I. THE IMPACT OF THE TEACHING OF PROCEDURE ON THE
LEGAL PROFESSION
A. CANADA: LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE PROFESSION AT THE
CROSSROADS
1.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PROFESSION AND LEGAL EDUCATION IN
CANADA2

Much of the story of the legal profession and of legal education in the common
law parts of Canada can be told through a history of a building in Toronto known
as Osgoode Hall.3
The Law Society of Upper Canada was founded in 1797, a date early in
Canadian history. At that time it had been less than two decades since Britain
lost its American colonies in the War of Independence and less than a generation
since it had gained control of the parts of North America that would eventually
become Canada. In an effort to improve the governance of this distant outpost,
the area had been divided into two colonies—“Upper” Canada (now Ontario)—so
named because it was farther up the St. Lawrence River than “Lower” Canada
(now Quebec).
In 1791, with the creation of Upper Canada, William Osgoode was named
the first Chief Justice. And it was barely six years later that a professional body
of lawyers called the Law Society of Upper Canada came together to provide the
province with a “learned and honourable body, to assist their fellow subjects as
occasion may require, and to support and maintain the constitution of the said
Province.”4 In other parts of the world, where the legal profession is regulated by
the state, the objective of serving the public would not seem unusual. However, the
mandate assumed by the self-regulated Law Society of Upper Canada to “support
and maintain the constitution of the Province” might be seen as an encroachment
on the role of state officials. Nevertheless, this central role for lawyers seemed quite
natural to Upper Canada, and the Law Society prospered.
In 1829, the Law Society members had amassed the resources to purchase a
sizeable property and construct a substantial building to house the law courts and to
provide a place where they could offer classes to their students at law. This building
was named Osgoode Hall after the first Chief Justice. At that time, and for some
2.
3.
4.

Janet Walker took the lead in preparing this section.
John Honsberger, Osgoode Hall: An Illustrated Story (Toronto: The Osgoode Society for Legal
History, 2004).
Law Society of Upper Canada, “History,” online: <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/with.aspx?id=427>.
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time to come, entrance to the profession was primarily through apprenticeship:
“Students at law,” or “articled clerks,” learned the profession by working under the
supervision of lawyers. However, beginning in the nineteenth century, the lawyers
began to offer classroom instruction to their “students at law” to enhance the
education they received. This form of education—an apprenticeship supplemented
by classes offered by practitioners—continued through the nineteenth century and
into the early twentieth century. Interestingly, at one point in the late nineteenth
century, the resources for providing these classes faltered and the students took it
upon themselves to organize lectures on law, which they invited the members of
the profession to provide.
As the country expanded west and new provinces were created, some members
of the Law Society of Upper Canada also moved west and established the governing
bodies of the profession in the newly formed western provinces. They took with
them the perspectives on the legal profession, its role in society, the way it should
be governed, and on legal education that they had developed in Upper Canada
(now called Ontario).5 This shared history among the founders of the various
law societies may well be credited with creating a significant degree of common
understanding among members of the profession throughout the country—one
that has largely continued until today.
2.

THE PROFESSIONAL ACCREDITATION OF LAW SCHOOLS IN ONTARIO

Until the middle of the twentieth century, the law school at Osgoode Hall was
the only accredited provider of legal education in Ontario that was officially
recognized by the Law Society of Upper Canada. While other universities in the
province began to offer courses and programs in law, and while students interested
in the law were free to study at any one of them, to practise law it was necessary
to graduate from Osgoode Hall.
Nevertheless, considerable prestige was brought to the profession by admitting
members who had previously studied law as an academic subject, and eventually the
value of an academic degree to a practising lawyer was formally acknowledged. In
1957 the Law Society decided to accredit the five existing universities in Ontario
as providers of law degrees that would be recognized as necessary pre-requisites
to the Bar Admission Course. A decade later, an affiliation agreement was entered
5.

Upper Canada no longer exists. In 1841, Upper and Lower Canada were united as the
Province of Canada in a bid to better secure the governance of the colony. At that time,
Upper Canada was renamed Canada West. In 1867, Canada West became the new province
of Ontario when Canada ceased to be a colony and became a federation of four provinces.
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into with the newly established York University, and the law school at Osgoode
Hall became Osgoode Hall Law School of York University (the sixth accredited
university in Ontario). Thereafter, only the Bar Admission Course was taught at
“Old” Osgoode Hall.
For the next five decades, relatively little changed in the relations between
legal education and the profession. Despite the establishment of new universities,
no new law schools were created in Ontario.6 Comparatively onerous admission
standards were maintained for lawyers with foreign degrees who wished to be
licensed to practise in Ontario and elsewhere in Canada. This kept the proportion
of those who gained admission on the basis of a foreign degree very small. The
number of places in some law schools increased over the years, but these increases
represented relatively minor incremental changes in the overall availability of the
places in the programs leading to the degree required for access to the profession.
This maintenance of the status quo in the face of the steady increase in the population
of Ontario and the demand for legal services had a remarkable effect. The places in
law schools became more and more scarce, and increased competition for them
raised the standards for applicants and, accordingly, assured that the graduating
students entering the profession were highly talented and motivated in their
chosen profession.
The inherent talent of the cohort of law students and the extent to which
they value their opportunity to practise law may be no guarantee of the ease of
regulating them as members of the profession, but it would seem reasonable to
believe that there could be some correlation. Accordingly, as the overall quality
and commitment of the entrants to the profession increased, it was unlikely that
a reason for reviewing the effectiveness of the profession’s regulation in Ontario
would emerge.
3.

THE EMERGENCE OF A PROFESSION OF PARALEGALS AND THEIR
REGULATION

As places in law schools became scarcer and demands for legal services increased,
the quality of the services provided was not likely to be an issue of concern for
regulators. However, quality is only one aspect of concern in the provision of
legal services. Two other key aspects of the provision were not addressed by the
evolution of this model over time: the availability and the cost of legal services.
With proportionately fewer lawyers to provide legal services—lawyers whose

6.

It would not be feasible to establish a law school without accreditation.
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heightened abilities and aspirations brought corresponding increases in career
expectations—the availability of affordable legal services was bound to decline.
The response to this need, particularly in an era in which information about
the law and the justice system was more readily available to the public, was an
increase in the provision of legal services by paralegals. Paralegals initially acted
independently and without the supervision of lawyers. In an area that is otherwise
regulated, the provision of services in the absence of regulation raises obvious
concerns. A range of responses could be imagined to address these concerns. One
might expect to see the imposition of limits on the services that such service
providers are permitted to provide, and one might expect this to be combined
with no regulation, government regulation, or self-regulation. None of these
responses were adopted in Ontario. Instead, in 2007, the Law Society Act was
amended to make the Law Society of Upper Canada responsible for regulating
the paralegal profession.7
It is worth pausing here to note that the regulation of the legal profession in
Canada is unusual. In many civil law countries, the profession is regulated by the
state, and the promotion of the welfare of the members of the profession is typically
undertaken by provincial associations. The separation of these functions is thought
to be an important safeguard against the potential conflict between these roles. By
contrast, in many common law countries the profession is self-regulating. The courts
usually oversee admission to the bar, and this is thought to be an important safeguard
against the potential for conflicts brought about by state regulation of lawyers. But,
the standards for professional conduct and the maintenance of discipline are usually
the responsibility of particular departments of the local bar association.
In Canada, as in other jurisdictions, the voices of the profession—the bodies
that promote the welfare of the members of the profession—are the Federal and
provincial bar associations. The bar associations are vigorous supporters of the
interests of the profession. However, unlike other jurisdictions, the bar associations
neither license nor discipline lawyers. Apart from the role that they play in continuing
legal education, these associations have relatively little to do with the academic
degree program necessary for admission to the profession.
In Canada, it is the provincial law societies, not the bar associations, that
license lawyers and set and maintain standards of professional conduct. The law
societies serve these functions as bodies that are independent of the state and the
7.

For the amending statutory provisions, see Access to Justice Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 21, Sched
C, s 19. For the current statutory provisions, see Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8, ss
25.1-25.2.
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courts and, moreover, are independent of the role of advocating on behalf of the
profession. While Canada is typical of other common law countries in having a
self-regulated legal profession, the regulators—the law societies—are not also the
advocates for the interests of the profession. Rather, the law societies regulate on
behalf of the public. While the regulators in civil law countries are usually not
independent of government, and the regulators in common law countries are not
independent of the profession, in Canada the regulators are independent of both.
This unique role may well have contributed to the confidence of the Law
Society of Upper Canada when it took on the responsibility of regulating paralegals
in Ontario. In the initiatives taken to address the need for paralegal regulation,
a standing committee comprised of paralegals and members of the Law Society’s
governing board established the regulatory framework, together with Rules of
Conduct and an application process. The immediate results have been that, apart
from specified exemptions, anyone providing legal services in Ontario, whether a
lawyer or a paralegal, is subject to licensing requirements; and the Law Society is
authorized to educate and license paralegals and to regulate their conduct.
The larger implications for the profession, however, are profound. With the
rise of paralegals, a key feature of the role of the professional community of lawyers
in the larger community (i.e., their monopoly on the provision of legal services)
was at risk of disappearing. The introduction of paralegal regulation in Ontario
did not, however, undermine the centrality of the legal profession, but instead
re-affirmed and even strengthened it. Unlike the situation in the United States, in
Ontario, paralegals may provide certain legal services without the supervision of
lawyers. However, they do so under the regulation of the Law Society. Thus, the
amended regulatory framework in which these legal services are provided, whether
by lawyers or by paralegals, has preserved the central place of the professional
community of lawyers in the justice system.
Can a link be drawn between these developments and the ongoing exposure of
law students to current issues and debates concerning the civil justice system and the
provision of legal services through the inclusion of a required course on civil procedure
in the law school curriculum? The profession demonstrated considerable flexibility and
adaptability that enabled it to retain a central role in the provision of legal services in the
face of important changes in the demands for legal services. Could this be attributed to
the universal engagement by members of the profession with the broader issues of civil
justice at the academic stage of their preparation for the profession? It may be difficult
to demonstrate such a link in any conclusive way. However, comparison with recent
experience in other jurisdictions, notably England and Wales, as discussed in a later
section of this article, suggests that such a connection might not be purely speculative.
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B. ACCREDITATION OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN CANADA8

The rise of paralegals in the provision of legal services has not been the only
significant change in the structure of the profession in recent years that might
suggest the significance of the role of teaching civil procedure as an academic
subject. Another such development has related to the formal requirements for legal
education as a necessary prerequisite to admission to the profession.
As mentioned, the provincial and territorial law societies of Canada have the
statutory responsibility to regulate Canada’s legal profession in the public interest.
This responsibility includes admitting lawyers to the profession, stipulating the
articling requirement, setting bar admission examinations and courses, overseeing
continuing professional development and quality, regulating professional discipline
and, if necessary, removing lawyers from the profession. In all common law
provinces and territories there are three requirements for admission to the bar: a
Canadian law degree or its equivalent, successful completion of a bar admission
or licensing program, and completion of an apprenticeship known as articling.
For applicants who receive their legal training outside Canada, the determination
of what constitutes qualifications equivalent to a Canadian law degree is made by
the National Committee on Accreditation, a committee of the Federation of Law
Societies of Canada (FLSC).
In Canada, until quite recently, no national standards or academic requirements
for a law degree were ever developed. The closest de facto standard was a brief two-page
outline of requirements, which the Law Society of Upper Canada approved in 1957
and revised in 1969. This outline included a list of compulsory courses, among
which was Civil Procedure. These requirements have only recently been reviewed
and, although they were informally adopted in other provinces, they were never
formally approved by other law societies. Furthermore, unlike the situation in the
United States, in Canada until recently there has never been any formal review of
the degree programs of accredited law schools to determine whether they merit
continued accreditation. This brief outline of required components for an accredited
law degree reflected a workable balance between regulatory and academic priorities,
and it afforded to the law schools the necessary flexibility for them to innovate
in response to changing needs. For example, in the case of civil procedure, the
current content of the required course and the approach to its objectives bear little
relation to those of its counterparts in the 1950s and 1960s.9 Concentration on
8.
9.

Lorne Sossin took the lead in preparing this section.
Knutsen et al, supra note 1 at 14.
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the technical details of the rules and the practice of civil litigation has long since
given way to a broader consideration of the various contexts in which they operate.
Nevertheless, in 2006, after nearly a half-century without any new law schools
in Ontario, the pressure to expand the positions for students in accredited programs
led to applications for accreditation or expressions of interest from a number of
new universities.10 A number of provinces also enacted legislation respecting access
to regulated professions that required regulators to ensure that admission processes
for domestic- and internationally-trained applicants were transparent, objective,
impartial, and fair. Further, the number of internationally-trained applicants for
entry to bar admission programs in Canadian common law jurisdictions11 was
on the rise. The standard for such applicants is that they have legal education
equivalent to the requirements for a Canadian common law degree, which
highlighted the need to delineate those requirements. Finally, the federal and
provincial governments made clear their commitment to national labour
mobility and harmonized standards, underscoring the national dimension
of this concern. A 2007 Canadian Competition Bureau study on regulated
professions explicitly questioned the justification for variations in admissions
requirements between law societies.12
The FLSC created a Task Force, which generated significant controversy from
the start. Many academics and legal educators viewed its activities as a threat to
academic freedom and institutional autonomy, while lawyers from across the
country weighed in on what might be deemed to be the essential elements of
a lawyer’s training. Some lawyers also expressed the concern that this initiative
would download or offload the responsibility for professional training from law
societies to law schools.13 The Council of Canadian Law Deans (CCLD) were
concerned to ensure that a national requirement would preserve the flexibility
that Canadian law schools required to continue to innovate in legal education to
position graduates for valuable and diverse roles in society. The CCLD opposed
the imposition of required competencies,14 and some law schools also voiced their
10. Including Lakehead University, Wilfred Laurier University, Laurentian University, and the
University of Waterloo.
11. That is, all provinces and territories outside of Québec.
12. Government of Canada, Competition Bureau, Self-Regulated Professions: Balancing
competition and regulation (2007) at 65, online: <http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/
site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/Professions-study-final-E.pdf/$FILE/Professions-study-final-E.pdf>.
13. For a discussion of some of the reaction to the Final Report, see Jean Sorenson, “Setting the
Standard” Canadian Lawyer (Fall 2010), online: <http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/
Setting-the-standard.html>.
14. The CCLD submission read in part:
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opposition.15 In addition, an ad-hoc group of legal academics held a symposium
on the Task Force and issued their own submission raising concerns that the Task
Force was proceeding without sufficient evidence and understanding of the nature
and diversity of legal education.16
Despite this controversy, in October 2009 the FLSC released their Task Force’s
Final Report.17 The Task Force recommended that the FLSC adopt a national
academic requirement for entry to the bar admission programs of the common
law jurisdictions. The rationale for developing a requirement that applies equally
to applicants educated in Canada and internationally is to ensure that all those
seeking to enter bar admission programs in Canadian common law jurisdictions
have demonstrated certain essential and predefined competencies in the academic
portion of their legal education.
The FLSC observed that accrediting bodies in peer jurisdictions use one of two
approaches to determine whether an applicant for admission meets the necessary
academic requirements: either successful completion of specified courses or passage
of a substantive law bar examination. The Task Force noted what it took to be an
increasing focus on learning outcomes rather than prescriptive input requirements.18
It proposed a national requirement expressed in terms of competencies in basic skills,
awareness of appropriate ethical values, and core legal knowledge that law students
can reasonably be expected to have acquired during the academic component of
In general terms, CCLD is of the view that the current situation, where Canadian law schools
enjoy a margin of maneuver to set those requirements, subject to the general policies of their
universities, produces satisfactory results. While the requirements imposed by each law school
are broadly similar, we note that the liberty they currently enjoy is used to tailor their programs
to specific situations or to implement initiatives that are designed to respond to the increasingly
diverse needs of the legal profession. There is no evidence that this flexibility threatens the protection of the public in any way. Accordingly, we would urge the task force not to recommend
the adoption of any stringent standards with respect to those issues.

15.
16.
17.
18.

See Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Task Force on the Canadian Common Law
Degree, Final Report (October 2009) at 38-39, Appendix 6, online: <http://www.flsc.
ca/_documents/Common-Law-Degree-Report-C(1).pdf>. Lorne Sossin was a member of the
CCLD at the time of the submission.
This group of law schools included Osgoode Hall Law School, whose Faculty Council passed
a motion opposing the initiative in the spring of 2009.
Federation of Law Societies of Canada, supra note 14 at 47.
See generally Ibid. See also Sorenson, supra note 13.
Federation of Law Societies of Canada, supra note 14 at 4. The Task Force appeared to be
influenced in particular by a report by the Carnegie Foundation. See William M Sullivan
et al, “Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law” Carnegie Foundation
for the Advancement of Teaching (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2007), online: <http://www.
carnegiefoundation.org/publications/educating-lawyers-preparation-profession-law>.
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their education. The recommendations were adopted by each of the provincial
and territorial law societies in the spring of 2010. Subject to the recommendations
of an implementation committee struck in the summer of 2010, new entrants to
the Bar would fall under this scheme commencing in 2015.19
There are three areas of required competencies. The first area of competency
is skills-based, which includes problem solving, the ability to conduct research,
and the ability to communicate orally and in writing in one of the two official
languages, as these skills would be relevant to legal practice.20 The second area
of competency relates to an awareness and understanding of ethics and the legal
profession, which must be provided in a stand-alone course. The third area of
competency relates to substantive legal knowledge21 of the foundations of law,22
the public law of Canada,23 and private law principles.24 In listing the substantive
competencies, the Task Force emphasized that these are competencies, not courses,
and that law students should be able to satisfy them in a number of ways that
may differ from competency to competency and from law school to law school.
However, the FLSC expressly indicated that civil procedure, one of the formerly
required courses, would not be included as a required competency:
The Federation has deleted civil procedure as a required competency. It is important
for law students to understand the principles that govern the resolution of disputes
in the Canadian common law system; it is not essential for them to learn specific

19. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, supra note 14.
20. In general the Task Force recommends that the FLSC leave it to law schools to determine
how their graduates accomplish the required competencies. The Task Force justified the
requirement of a stand-alone course for ethics and professionalism because they “lie at the
core of the legal profession. It is important that students begin to appreciate this early in their
legal education.” Ibid at 4. However, the FLSC did not stipulate any particular pedagogy for
such a course, or whether it is taught in a descriptive, normative, or expressly critical fashion.
21. In determining the required substantive legal knowledge, the Task Force considered the
continued relevance of the current first-year curriculum of the sixteen Canadian law schools
offering a common law degree, the importance of students having foundational knowledge
in both public and private law, the competency research undertaken by various law societies
in Canada, the regulatory approach in other comparable common law jurisdictions, and
the importance of ensuring that the requirements do not interfere with the flexibility and
innovation in current law school education.
22. This includes principles of common law and equity, the process of statutory construction and
analysis, and the administration of the law in Canada.
23. This includes constitutional law (including federalism and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), human rights principles, the rights of Aboriginal peoples of Canada, Canadian
criminal law, and the principles of Canadian administrative law.
24. This includes contracts, torts, property law, and legal and fiduciary concepts in commercial
relationships.
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practice rules in law school. Students should be exposed to the principles while
learning the foundations of common law.25

The reasons for removing civil procedure from the list of “core” courses are
not entirely clear. While it was formerly included among the list of courses that are
now captured in a list of “substantive legal knowledge” competencies, it is clearly
different from them. It is understandable, therefore, that it would be thought
suitable to be captured in the heading “foundations of common law.” Moreover,
it may not have been obvious to the Task Force that topics such as “ethics and
professionalism” are currently taught in context in the course on procedure. In
this way, the newly added requirement of a stand-alone course on ethics and
professionalism may wind up capturing in some measure the discussions currently
pursued in the stand-alone civil procedure course. In this sense, there are larger,
systemic reasons that might provide more compelling explanations for the apparent
elimination of procedure as a required course. To the extent that “civil procedure”
no longer comprises a detailed study of the technicalities of the rules, as it once
did, a formal acknowledgment that such a course is outmoded simply operates to
give official sanction to the current curriculum. Otherwise, the proposal would
seem to be misguided.
Despite the significant evolution in the law school curriculum in other areas
over the decades, Canadian law schools around the country have continued to teach
civil procedure, with a number of these schools folding it into a broader course on
“Legal Process,” which also introduces students to alternative dispute resolution
and other forms of legal process (e.g., public inquiries) and some schools offer it
as an upper year course. Given the significant evolution—even to the point of
changing the name of the course—there is no indication that the persistence of
the course is a result of a perfunctory sense of obligation to adhere to the original
list of required courses. Civil procedure remains more widely taught than some
areas that are slated to become required competencies, such as fiduciary duties in
commercial settings, under the FLSC standards.
It might not be obvious to those from outside Canada why civil procedure is
taught instead of criminal procedure, why one court’s rules are taught rather than
another (e.g., the Federal Court, provincial Family Courts, Small Claims Courts,
et cetera), and why litigation is emphasized in the face of the rise of other forms
of dispute resolution. Despite this, and despite the varying contours of the course
in terms of topics and teaching formats, the teaching of procedure has remained
a substantial feature of every law school curriculum in Canada. Perhaps ubiquitous
25. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, supra note 14, Appendix 5.
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familiarity with the core content of the course caused it to be taken for granted—just
as the formal study of English grammar might seem superfluous to educators in
Anglophone countries. Indeed, the FLSC’s prescribed competencies include “an
awareness of the importance of professionalism in dealing with clients, other
counsel, judges, court staff and members of the public.”26 Such awareness would
be possible only with a basic understanding of the litigation process. Indeed, much
of “ethics and professionalism” would seem abstract if it were studied without
reference to the litigation process.
In the end, the FLSC competencies are unlikely to have a significant impact
on the approach taken in well-established law schools to the teaching of procedure.
The FLSC Task Force’s Final Report prescribed competencies, not courses, and the
traditional course on civil procedure has long been left behind in many law
schools in favour of a broader introduction to civil justice and dispute resolution.
It remains to be seen whether there will be any effect of the implicit suggestion
that the teaching of procedure be infused in various required courses throughout
the curriculum, rather than taught as an independent subject. Nevertheless, this
suggestion highlights how attending to the experience of the impact of teaching
procedure in other legal systems might give valuable context and perspective to
the value of identifying procedure as a discrete subject at this important juncture
in the history of legal education in Canada.
C. ENGLAND AND WALES: THE STORY OF THE LEGAL SERVICES ACT (THE
ACADEMY AND THE PROFESSION—WORLDS APART)27

The teaching of procedure in England and its relationship to the legal profession
can be sharply contrasted with the situations in Canada and the United States.
Whereas in the United States top law schools may boast about the quality of their
procedure scholars, such scholars are less common in England and tend to live in
the shadows of their more illustrious private law colleagues working in property
or contract, for example, or public law scholars working in the fields of human
rights or criminal law. English procedure scholars usually spend most of their
time teaching subjects other than procedure because so few law schools include
procedure on the syllabus, either as a core subject or as an optional subject.
In contrast to Ontario, where to gain the right to practice law once required
passing through a building known as Osgoode Hall, in England there have been
no clear paths to practice, let alone a single path. Even today, many English
lawyers have not studied law at university, but found their way into practice after
26. Ibid at 9.
27. Andrew Higgins took the lead in preparing this section.
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studying other subjects. This phenomenon has a long history. According to David
Lemmings, in the eighteenth century “there was no clear uniform pattern” as to
how one became a barrister, which caused confusion amongst aspiring barristers
and their families. Some favoured a preparatory spell at the university, some were
apprenticed to attorneys, some paid to spend a period in the office of a special
pleader, and some formed debating clubs with their fellow students. All would
have grappled with introductory primers and reports in their chambers and would
have visited Westminster Hall to observe barristers in action.28
The university option rarely included law, which was looked down upon as
a purely practical or mechanical art. In an opening lecture at Oxford as the first
Vinerian Professor of the Laws of England, William Blackstone introduced his
subject in an apologetic fashion: “[The study of law] has generally been reputed
(however unjustly) of a dry and unfruitful nature; and of which the theoretical,
elementary parts have hitherto received a very moderate share of cultivation.”29
While the study of law at University may no longer be viewed as a “dry and disgusting
study,”30 alternative routes to practice remain popular in England. Some of England’s
best known judges in the twentieth century studied subjects other than law. The
most popular subject for future Law Lords was classics. Those who studied law
often did it as a second degree, and some never set foot in a law school.31
This background poses considerable challenges for any fruitful discussion of
the relationship between the teaching of a particular subject, such as procedure, and
professional attitudes in England. Even if the teaching of procedure were common
in law schools32 it would be difficult to speculate about its effect on the profession
because many members of the profession in England have bypassed the study of
law at university altogether, whether as a first or second degree.
The limited or non-existent treatment of civil procedure in the curriculum
of law degrees around the country might suggest, according to this article’s title,
that English lawyers and judges do not critically engage with procedural issues as
much as we would like. To the extent that this is a reasonable hypothesis—and
there is plenty of anecdotal evidence to support it—it may be the product of a
self-perpetuating mythology. Procedure is only taught at the vocational training
28. David Lemmings, Professors of the Law: Barristers and English Legal Culture in the Eighteenth
Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 108.
29. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England (delivered 25 October 1758), s 1.
30. Lemmings, supra note 28 at 131.
31. Tom Bingham, “The Law Lords: Who has Served” in Louis Blom-Cooper, Brice Dickson &
Gavin Drewry, eds, The Judicial House of Lords 1867–2009 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009) 122 at 123.
32. And it is not. See Erik S Knutsen et al, supra note 1.
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stage of legal education. Therefore, like the study of law itself three hundred years
ago, it is viewed as a mechanical and technical discipline only.
The view that procedure is not a subject worthy of academic study may also
be partly attributable to the structure of the English legal profession. Practice and
procedure has traditionally been the domain of solicitors, a branch of the profession
that was populated by lawyers who were considered to be of a lower class (intellectually
and perhaps even socially) than barristers. As advocates, barristers needed an excellent
working knowledge of the rules of evidence (a subject that enjoys a higher profile
at many English law schools) whereas issues of procedure could be left to solicitors.
It may be difficult to draw any firm links between, on the one hand, the
teaching of procedure and professional attitudes towards the subject and, on the
other hand, the importance of the teaching of procedure to legal thought and
the administration of justice. Even qualitative surveys have inherent limitations.
However, even if many practitioners consider procedure to be a technical subject
with little intellectual substance, this view is not shared by the judiciary. Major
judge-led reviews and reforms of the English Civil Justice system have engaged
strongly with academic scholarship on procedure. These include Lord Woolf ’s
access to justice review in the mid-1990s33 and Sir Rupert Jackson’s review of civil
litigation costs in 2009.34
Interest in procedure scholarship by English judges is not surprising. Judges are
in large part responsible for the efficacy and fairness of the system as a whole, and
hence they are likely to have a keen interest in the systemic values and constraints
that are the subject of much procedure scholarship. By way of illustration, judges
of the higher courts in England, including the Court of Appeal and the House of
Lords (now the Supreme Court) have often engaged with the research of Adrian
Zuckerman, Professor of Civil Procedure at the University of Oxford, endorsing
his account of a procedural rule35 or going out of their way to explain why they
have not adopted an interpretation of a rule advocated by him.36
A critical development worth noting is that the legal profession in England is
in the process of potentially radical change. The Legal Services Act37 overhauled the
33. The Right Honourable Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report (July 1996), online: <http://
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/index.htm>.
34. Lord Justice Rupert Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (May 2009),
online: <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/JCO%2fDocuments%2fReports%2fjackson-finalreport-140110.pdf>.
35. Three Rivers District Council and others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England,
[2004] UKHL 48 at para 34, [2005] 1 AC 610.
36. C plc v P & Anor, [2008] Ch 1, [2007] 3 All ER 1034 (CA).
37. Legal Services Act 2007 (UK), c 29.
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regulation of lawyers and in key respects de-regulated the profession with a view
to promoting greater competition amongst legal service providers and greater
access to justice. The reforms were driven by a belief that self-regulation of the
profession was inappropriate and that self-regulation had demonstrably failed to
deliver competent affordable legal assistance and access to justice to many people.
In explaining the reforms, the Lord Chancellor stated his belief that this unsatisfactory
position was not the product of the legal education system, but the structure of the
profession. He stated:
The British legal system’s excellent reputation and education, which will produce
our next generation of brilliant lawyers, must be allowed to flourish.
But there are some real risks facing the legal profession. The risk that, under the
current structure and regulations, too many consumers are being failed.
Pure self-regulation is not inspiring sufficient confidence among clients. People are
not convinced by bodies who act as both the team manager and the referee.
And people cannot get legal advice in the way they often need it most. People don’t
want to have to traipse between firms, chambers, advice centres - getting piecemeal
help from each. Whether it’s housing, insurance, or representation in a court issue,
clients want a seamless service from their providers.38

In 2007, the Law Society’s dual functions of regulator and union were split,
and the regulatory framework was overhauled so that regulation is now focused
on a set of “reserved legal activities,” which presently include advocacy, conducting
litigation, reserved instrument activities, probate activities, notarial activities, and
the administration of oaths.39 Such services can be provided only by authorized
persons. There are presently eight “approved regulators” who have the power to
grant such authorization.40 Interestingly, the dispute resolution-related activities
among these services are those that have traditionally been within the purview
of barristers. In that sense, the barristers—the lawyers whose primary functions
relate to trial practice—have retained their monopoly whereas the solicitors—the

38. Lord Chancellor, “Legal Services Reform” (Speech delivered at the St Paul Traveler’s
Conference: On Risk, Haberdasher’s Hall London, 8 June 2005) [copy on file with the
author].
39. Legal Services Act 2007, supra note 37, s 12.
40. These are The Law Society, The Bar Council, The Master of the Faculties, The Council for
Licensed Conveyancers, The Institute of Legal Executives, The Chartered Institute of Patent
Agents, The Institute of Trade Mark Attorneys and The Association of Law Costs Draftsmen.
The regulatory arm of these bodies must be separated from the representative arm.
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lawyers who would effectively be the face of civil justice to the general public in
non-litigious matters and disputes in the pre-trial phase—have lost theirs. These
legal services, including many types of advice work, are not now regulated as legal
services at all. These include employment advice, welfare and benefits guidance,
and will-writing services.41 Nothing prevents any new firm or individual from
offering these services to the general public.
In addition, the Legal Services Act facilitated an expansion in the number and
types of businesses that can apply for authorization to provide reserved legal services,
and permits lawyers to enter into partnerships with other service providers, such
as accountants, financial advisors, or management consultants. The Legal Services
Act also allows partial or external ownership of legal practices, enabling general
businesses, such as banks or supermarkets, to set up legal divisions, which provide
legal services to their customers.42 The intention was that the “Tesco Law” concept43
and multi-disciplinary partnerships with providers of services other than legal
advice will reduce the cost of legal services and allow clients to obtain a seamless
service from their providers. One of the major advocates of these reforms has been
the Office of Fair Trading, which, along with its predecessor, has been arguing for
much greater competition in the legal profession for decades. In 2001, it produced
a report on Competition in Professions in which it stated that “the professions are
run by producers largely on behalf of producers.”44
It may be difficult to determine whether a causal relationship can be drawn between
the way the English legal system reached this point and the legal profession’s view of
the importance of promoting access to justice and of learning about procedure as
an academic subject. Arguably, an absence of procedure as an academic discipline
may have contributed to the profession’s loss of public confidence and the widening
gap between law in books and law in action. A self-regulating profession, whose
engagement with debates about procedural values and systemic constraints was
limited, was seemingly unable or unwilling to move with the times and respond
to the changing needs of the public or even engage in a discussion about what
those needs are and how they could best be met.
Had there been a tradition of academic study of procedure, it might have
contributed to enlightened thinking that could disrupt the profession’s vested
41. If lawyers are regulated because of their title—solicitor, barrister, notary, et cetera—then they
are bound by general codes of conduct when they undertake this so called unreserved work.
42. Known as alternative business structures under the statute. See Legal Services Act 2007, supra
note 37, Part 5.
43. Named after British supermarket chain Tesco.
44. John Vickers, “Competition in the Professions” The Office of Fair Trading (March 2001) at
para 10, online: <www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/professional_bodies/oft328.pdf>.
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interest in maintaining a closed shop and cost rules permitting lawyers to either
charge fees by the hour without an upper limit regardless of the outcome of the
dispute or double their hourly fee as a success premium when operating on a
conditional fee basis.45 In this way, the intransigence of the profession (whether
caused by a narrow approach lacking in foresight or otherwise) may have ironically
prompted de-regulation based on market-oriented procedure research, which looks
at increasing the number of ways consumers can access the system. It is clear, in
any event, that the legal profession has changed. Legal service providers operate
in new forms and are subject to new pressures and conflicts, which in turn are
generating new problems for the administration of justice. These developments
will warrant close study by procedure scholars.46
D. THE UNITED STATES: THE ROLE OF THE BAR IN GOVERNANCE AND IN
SETTING EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS47

According to an old proverb, if you want a description of water, do not ask a
fish. Similarly, a typical legal educator in the United States may not know how to
answer the question of whether it is possible to trace a link between the teaching of
procedure and the state of the profession. Legal education and the legal profession
in the United States have always been highly integrated in a far more definitive
way than they have been in Canada. This section describes the nature of that
integration and its implications for legal education and for the legal profession.
1.

THE GOVERNANCE OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

The study of law in the United States did not begin as an academic subject but as
a response to a public concern about professional competence and the standards
of the practising bar. Dissatisfied with the results achieved by the informal learning
derived from the practice of having young lawyers become apprentices to established
members of the legal profession, lawyers sought to improve the knowledge and skills
of new members of the profession by creating law schools in the mid-nineteenth
century and by instituting examinations as part of the process of being admitted
to the bar. Perhaps even more significantly than this, the concern to maintain
public confidence in the competence of lawyers brought about the creation of the
45. These costs rules were one of the main subjects of Jackson’s review and came in for stinging
criticism. See Jackson, supra note 34 at ch 10.
46. Legal Services Board, “Market impacts of the Legal Services Act 2007 - Baseline Report
(Final) 2012, para 1.17
47. Janet Walker took the lead in preparing this section.
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American Bar Association (ABA) in 1878. Since that time, the ABA has played
an integral role in shaping the law school curriculum.
The distinction between the US and Canadian models of professional
regulation in respect of legal education is subtle but significant. In both countries,
the professional association and the body responsible for admitting new members
are separate entities. In Ontario, for example, the body responsible for the regulation
of the profession is the Law Society of Upper Canada (a body that, as mentioned
above, is independent of both the government and the judiciary) and the body
responsible for the welfare of the profession is the Ontario Bar Association, which
is affiliated with the Canadian Bar Association and the bar associations of the
other provinces. Similarly, in New York, for example, the New York State Board
of Law Examiners (operating under the auspices of the New York State Court of
Appeals) is responsible for administering the bar examination to candidates seeking
admission to practise law in the State of New York.
However, the relationship that the regulators and the professional associations
bear to professional discipline and to legal education in Canada and the United
States is different. In Canada, the regulators (the law societies) have primary
responsibility for professional discipline and for setting the standards for the legal
education required for admission to the bar, whereas in the United States, the
professional association (the ABA) has primary responsibility for maintaining
professional and educational standards.
One other difference is noteworthy. In addition to completing an apprentice
year (articles) and successfully completing the bar admission examination, until
recently the Law Society of Upper Canada required each new member to take a
Bar Admission Course of roughly half a year because it ceded the responsibility
for providing more academic instruction to the faculties of law of the universities.
In this way, the regulator was in a position to use instruction and examination to
ensure that lawyers had the minimum level of required competence and was content
to maintain a more relaxed attitude to the practical relevance of the teaching and
learning involved in obtaining the basic law degree.
In contrast, the main requirement for entrance to the profession after obtaining
an accredited law degree in the United States is successful completion of the bar
admission exams. To be sure, many applicants take commercially provided bar
preparation courses, but neither the profession nor the state government nor the
judiciary have responsibility to provide or oversee any further education or
training in the classroom or on the job. Accordingly, the keen interest of the
profession in playing a direct role in shaping legal education in the context
of the basic law degree, and the profession’s direct responsibility to the public
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for ensuring that the basic law degree equips members of the profession to
practise in a way that will not require the ABA to discipline misconduct, is as
clear today in the United States as it was a century and a half ago when the
law schools were first created.
It is little wonder, then, that the question of whether a link can be drawn
between legal education, legal practice, and the state of the profession is puzzling
to Americans. The body responsible for establishing and maintaining the academic
standards of the basic law school curriculum for accredited law schools is also
responsible for advocating for and regulating the standards of the legal profession
on behalf of the public.
2.

ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING STANDARDS FOR LEGAL EDUCATION

In sharp contrast with the long history of minimalist standards for legal education in
Canada, in the United States the process of establishing and maintaining standards for
legal education is extensive and the standards themselves are detailed and comprehensive.
Any law school wishing to gain or maintain accreditation for its program must
comply with the standards established by the ABA.48 Each law school must provide
the ABA with an annual questionnaire, self-study, site evaluation questionnaire, and
any other information required by the Accreditation Committee and Council. There
are detailed protocols for the annual site visits, including the preparations that should
be made, the conduct of the visit, and the format of the report. There is extensive and
ongoing discussion and consultation over the details of the standards and the methods
by which they are assessed, and there is lively debate over the objectives of the standards
and whether they are appropriately framed. As may be expected, issues about whether
the best features of legal education can be reduced to specific criteria and whether their
provision in a given law school can be evaluated accurately in objectively measurable
ways are discussed with interest.
In addition to the routine engagement between the ABA and legal educators,
there are, from time to time, periods of more fundamental reflection on the purposes
of legal education and the possible need for fundamental reforms. One example
of this was the 1992 “Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession:

48. See American Bar Association, Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar,
“Accreditation,” online: <www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/
accreditation.html>. These standards are reviewed by the US Department of Education but
the ABA is the recognized accrediting agency.
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Narrowing the Gap.”49 This report, and the scholarly debate surrounding it,50
reflects a continuing engagement embedded in the culture of legal education over
the tension between the role of legal education in equipping graduates for a
successful career in practice and in fostering their intellectual curiosity about
the law.
This debate has many striking features. Perhaps most notable is that it plays out
within the law school and the legal academy, and not between the legal academy
and the legal profession. The tension between rigorous professional training and
scholarly exploration of larger themes is regarded as an integral feature of legal
education—a question that permeates both the broad contours of curricular design
and the specific features of course content and pedagogical method. However, the
implications of this tension are also telling. Accepting the centrality of the tension
means accepting the significance of the role played by legal educators who specialize
in areas that are relevant to practice. It also means encouraging all legal educators to
have regard for the aspects of their concentration areas that are relevant to practice.
Over time, it also arguably promotes a career path for legal educators in which
pre-law pursuits in other academic fields are prized and post-graduate pursuits are
more often directed at further study of law and clerkships rather than practice.
It might be imagined that a limited interest in post-graduate legal studies would
undermine the legal academy’s capacity to produce groundbreaking scholarship.
However, the reverse seems to be true. The close relationship between legal education
and the profession in a legal system in which legal practice is a prominent and popular
career aspiration fuels the demand for legal academics, thereby increasing the scale
and energy of academic engagement on questions of law. Moreover, coupled with
an economic model in which law schools are supported primarily by tuition fees and
private donors, the competition between them to recruit better faculty and students, and
generally to enhance the standing of the law school and support the career aspirations
of their students, drives up the standards for scholarship so that the ABA standards are
readily met in most institutions. All in all, the close relationship between the study and
49. American Bar Association, Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, “Report
of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap” Legal Education
and Professional Development – An Educational Continuum (July 1992), online: <http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/2013_legal_
education_and_professional_development_maccrate_report).authcheckdam.pdf>. This
report has come to be known as the “McCrate Report.”
50. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What’s Missing
from the MacCrate Report–Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being” (1994) 69:3
Wash L Rev 593; Roy T Stuckey, “Education for the Practice of Law: The Times They Are-AChangin’” (1996) 75:4 Nebraska L Rev 648.
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practice of law in the United States makes the implications for both so pervasive that
it could well be hard to know where to begin or end in describing them.
E.

AUSTRALIA: AN INCREASING INTEREST IN PROCEDURE AS AN
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE51

The origins of the Australian legal system and profession lie in the structures, practices,
and procedures of early nineteenth-century England. Until the mid-nineteenth century
the pathway into legal practice was through a form of apprenticeship. Prospective
lawyers would receive workplace training as articled clerks. The delivery of legal
education was undertaken by the legal profession and admission to legal practice was
controlled by the courts. In the 1850s, the first inroads into this model came with
the foundation of the University of Sydney Law School. The university in each state
followed suit, with Queensland being the last when the University of Queensland
established its Faculty of Law in 1935.52
By 1962 the transition from apprenticeship to university-based legal education
had advanced significantly. A government report into the future of tertiary education
(the Martin Report in 1965) found that the majority of lawyers in most states were
university graduates.53 Up until the 1970s, the law schools emphasized doctrinal
study delivered in large part by legal practitioners and supplemented by a very small
number of legal academics.54 The 1960s and 1970s saw a significant expansion in
the number of law schools55 and a significant increase in government funding that
enabled the establishment of a cohort of full-time legal academics. In addition to
attaining a critical mass, the new academics were imbued with the enthusiasms of
the time—critical studies, feminism, and generalized radicalism. This development
was not necessarily welcomed by the profession or by the courts. As the president
of the New South Wales Bar Association and later judge of the New South Wales
Supreme Court complained:
In the whole of Australia … there are only one or two academic teachers of any real
value in real property, in contracts or in torts, yet there are about seventeen [sic] law
schools. There are, to be sure, multitudes of academic homunculi who scribble and
prattle relentlessly about such non-subjects as criminology, bail, poverty, consumerism,
51. David Bamford took the lead in preparing this section.
52. Nikolas J James, “A Brief History of Critique in Australian Legal Education” (2000) 24:3
Melbourne U L Rev 965 at 967.
53. Michael Chesterman & David Weisbrot, “Legal Scholarship in Australia” (1987) 50:6 Mod L
Rev 709 at 711.
54. Ibid.
55. In 1960, there were six law schools; by 1986, there were thirteen.
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computers and racism. These may be dismissed from calculation: they possess neither
practical skills nor legal learning. They are failed sociologists.56

Despite such attitudes, law schools continued to develop as genuinely academic
institutions with a broader perspective of their role than they had when legal education
was largely an apprenticeship. In 1987, the Commonwealth Government commissioned
the Pearce Report57 into legal education. The Pearce Report has influenced the
development of legal education ever since. It recommended continuation of the
new approach to legal education with its emphasis on critical analysis of law,
encouragement of new teaching methods, and the development of skills teaching.
It also recommended increased government funding for law schools and warned
against the establishment of any new law schools.58 While there is clear evidence
to suggest that the first three recommendations have been adopted by many, if not
most, Australian law schools, the latter two recommendations have been ignored.
The number of law schools has grown from twelve in 1987 to thirty-five in 2011
and law continues to be one of the lowest funded disciplines.
By the 1990s the divide between the legal profession and legal education
had become almost complete. The dominant route to legal practice was through
an accredited law degree provided by a university, followed by a period of
professional legal training delivered by either universities (leading to a graduate
diploma in legal practice) or specially created training institutions (e.g., the Leo
Cussens Institute in Victoria and the College of Law in New South Wales).
Western Australia still allows for professional legal training through articles of
clerkship with a lawyer.
While direct involvement by the legal profession in the delivery of legal
education may have ended, the legal profession continues to exercise great
influence over legal education. Recent reviews of legal education recognize that
“the requirements of practice a[re] the dominant criterion for determining what
should be taught at law school. The legal profession has exercised and continues
to exercise considerable control over what is taught at law school, and has in
the last decade indicated its desire to exercise a greater degree of control.”59
56. R Meagher, “How Can You Learn Practice in Theory?” Proceedings and Papers of the 7th
Commonwealth Law Conference, Hong Kong (1983), cited in Chesterman & Weisbrot, supra
note 53 at 716.
57. Professor Dennis Pearce, Professor Enid Campbell & Professor Don Harding, Australian Law
Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the Commonwealth (Canberra: Australian Government
Publishing Service, 1987).
58. Eugene Clark, “Australian Legal Education: A Decade after the Pearce Report” (1997) 8:2
Legal Educ Rev 213.
59. Mary Keyes & Richard Johnstone, “Changing Legal Education: Rhetoric, Reality and
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The universities enjoy considerable autonomy in determining curriculum and
pedagogical approaches for their degrees, but the degrees need to be accredited
by the authorities controlling admission to legal practice. The constitution
and procedures of these authorities vary from state to state, but they are for all
practical purposes controlled by the senior judiciary and lawyers in each state.
In the early 1980s the Council of Chief Justices formed a committee chaired
by Justice Priestly called the Consultative Committee of State and Territory Law
Admitting Authorities (the Priestly Committee) to develop uniform admission
standards. By the early 1990s, the committee recommended that to obtain accreditation
a law school’s curriculum would need to cover eleven areas of required knowledge.
These areas were the core doctrinal areas (e.g., torts, property, and contract) with
two procedural areas (criminal and civil procedure) and professional conduct (which
included basic trust accounting). How these were to be taught was not prescribed
and the content was loosely defined. The “Priestly 11” (as they came to be known)
have formed the compulsory core of most law degrees. Some law schools have
made certain areas of required knowledge optional topics and not prerequisites for
graduation, but advise any student wishing to enter legal practice that they need to
ensure they have completed all eleven areas.60 The Priestly Committee has expanded
to include representation from the Council of Australian Law Deans and has been
renamed the Law Admissions Consultative Committee. It has now also prescribed
twelve areas of required knowledge for professional legal training courses (although
these are expressed as required areas of competency).
As Australia has no external bar examination or other external mechanism for
assessing whether graduates possess the knowledge required to enter the profession,
admission authorities have had to be satisfied that law schools are delivering this
knowledge. There continues to be great variation from state to state in the ways in
which this is done. In some states, law schools are subject to light scrutiny and are
required only to report significant changes in degrees. In others there is high level
of scrutiny with periodic reviews that examine everything from assessment schemes
to subject guides and qualifications of teaching faculty. However, the trend over
the last decade has been for the admission authorities to take a more active role in
scrutinizing law school curricula.
The advent of mutual recognition of qualifications across states in the 1990s
increased the need for uniformity of standards. In 2008, the Commonwealth
Prospects for the Future” (2004) 26:2 Sydney L Rev 537 at 555 [citation omitted].
60. The law degree at Monash University, for example, describes Civil Procedure as “quasicompulsory.” At the University of Melbourne, civil procedure is contained in a first-year
compulsory subject called Dispute Resolution.
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Government embarked on the creation of a national legal profession project
with a national legal services board setting admission standards. This project has
faltered because smaller states have opted not to co-operate with the transfer of
responsibility from states to a national body, but the courts and legal profession
continue to exercise major influence on legal education.
Within this context, civil procedure enjoys a distinctive place. The field of
civil procedure saw the least reduction in the legal profession’s involvement in the
delivery of legal education. Regarded by many legal academics as being primarily
a vocational subject, it was delivered in most law schools by legal practitioners.
This continues to be the case in many law schools, but the last fifteen years has
seen a steady growth in the numbers of legal academics teaching and researching
civil procedure. The links between the teaching of civil procedure and the legal
profession continue, but they have evolved. Full-time academics specializing
in civil procedure often have professional backgrounds, and many part-time
academics in the field continue to have a role in legal practice.
Traditionally civil procedure was taught as the study of the rules of court
with students learning the mechanics of procedure. More recently, civil procedure
courses have included broader dispute resolution topics, including the functions
of civil courts, the values underpinning civil procedure, ethics of litigation, and
facilitating access to justice.
Given its close relationship to the profession, it is somewhat surprising that
the greatest challenge to the future of civil procedure as an academic subject now
comes from the courts and the profession rather than from academia. When the
Priestly Committee first drafted its uniform admission standards in the 1980s,
civil procedure was not one of the recommended areas of required knowledge.
While it was included in the final report on uniform admission requirements
in 1992, this has been challenged. As recently as 2010, the Law Admissions
Consultative Committee considered dropping civil procedure as a required area
of knowledge in the law degree to make space for new areas of required knowledge
(e.g., statutory interpretation). While these deliberations were not public, it is
possible that the committee might have been influenced by the fact that one
of the required areas of competency for the professional legal training stage is
civil litigation practice. The committee might have thought that this required
area of competency would adequately include the teaching of civil procedure.
Yet, as will be discussed in Part II, the role of civil procedure teachers in the
broader process of civil justice reform has been increasing. The development of
a pool of legal academics with research interests in civil justice and litigation in
particular is becoming a valuable resource for government and courts. Whether
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the exposure of graduates to civil procedure in their legal education has encouraged
broader engagement with civil justice reform is more difficult to ascertain.

II. THE IMPACT OF THE TEACHING OF PROCEDURE ON CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM
Having canvassed the varying relationships between legal education and the
profession in the four jurisdictions, as well as the role that the teaching of civil
procedure might play in those relationships, we now turn to the implications for
civil justice reform as it occurs in each country.
A. CANADA: A MODEL OF BROADLY-BASED ENGAGEMENT61

Making allowances for the differences in scale, the processes of civil justice reform
in Canada are not too dissimilar from those in the United States. As one of two
legal advisors to the Federal Courts Rules Committee (Rules Committee),62 the
author of this section outlines that process as it occurs in Canada’s Federal Court,
which may be taken to be representative of a broadly-based engagement between
the courts, the profession, the public, and academics specializing in procedure.
As a preliminary note, it should be observed that the Federal Court63 in Canada
has a different mandate from that of its counterparts in Australia and the United
States. Lacking pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, it has a statutory jurisdiction
that specializes in key areas of law assigned by the Constitution to the federal
government of Canada, including maritime law, intellectual property, Aboriginal
law, and immigration. This means that there are specialist bars in these areas that
have a particular interest in practice before the Federal Court that makes them
keen interlocutors in developing reforms. It also means that many members of the
provincial bars across the country will only occasionally have proceedings in the
court, thereby heightening the significance of regular communications to keep the
profession apprised and engaged with recent developments and emerging issues of
practice and procedure. In other respects, the following process is not unlike that
which occurs in reforming the rules in the provincial superior courts.
Reforms of the Federal Court’s rules of procedure usually begin with issues
identified by courts in judgments or by communications with the court by members
61. Janet Walker took the lead in preparing this section.
62. One advisor for the common law, and one for the civil law.
63. Or, to be more precise, Federal Courts because the separate Tax Court and Court Martial
Appeals Court are also Federal Courts.
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of the profession. In some cases, these reforms emerge as significant reviews of an
area of practice, such as occurred in recent years in the areas of expert evidence and
summary judgment, but in other cases the reforms are of a more discrete nature.
In still other cases, the general evolution of practice before the Federal Court, as
has occurred in recent years through advances in technology, will occasion an
audit of the rules to ensure that they reflect current practice. Finally, periodic
comprehensive reviews of the rules are pursued, as occurred in 1998 and as is
currently underway, to identify areas of proactive reform that may be warranted
to ensure that the rules best facilitate the practice in the court.
The discussion of potential projects for reform usually begins in one of the
biannual plenary meetings of the Rules Committee, which consists of a number of
judges and prothonotaries of the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal,
key members of the court staff together with representatives of the specialist bars
that most frequently appear before the court, and the two academic advisors. The
preliminary discussion of a potential area of reform may be introduced by a member
of the Rules Committee or it may be based on a brief introductory discussion paper.
Should the Rules Committee support the further consideration of potential reform,
a Sub-Committee is usually established to study the matter further and develop
with the legal advisors a more formal discussion paper for broader consultation.
This will often involve research into recent reforms in the area in other jurisdictions
and into any pertinent academic commentary.64 The discussion paper will identify
a series of key issues for reform, sometimes including sample drafting language to
illustrate the options that might be considered. The discussion paper will usually
be reviewed in the next plenary meeting and then posted on the court’s website and
distributed through established lines of communication with the relevant sections
of the bar associations. Following a period of forty-five to sixty days for input, the
Sub-Committee and the legal advisors review the comments of members of the
public and prepare a follow-up report on them for the Plenary Committee together
with recommendations for the direction the reforms might take.
Once the Rules Committee is confident of the nature of the reforms it wishes
to pursue, the Sub-Committee and the legal advisors prepare instructions for the
legal drafters and jurilinguists to prepare draft rules. It should be noted here that
the entire process is bilingual. During the plenary meetings, members of the Rules
Committee intervene in either French or English, the materials for the meetings
64. For examples of such discussion papers, see Federal Court (Canada), Court Process and
Procedures, “Rules,” online: <http://cas-ncr-nter03.cas-satj.gc.ca/portal/page/portal/fc_cf_en/
Rules>.
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including the various discussion papers, minutes, et cetera are provided in both
official languages and, perhaps most significantly, the jurilinguists ensure that the
draft rules not only fit with the language in the existing rules but also match each
other in their effect. This is just one sense in which the process of rules reform
in the Federal Court is a model of engagement between those with specialized
knowledge: legal advisors familiar with developments in other jurisdictions and
having experience in the way in which the rules fit within the broader context
of procedural values, jurilinguists adept in identifying the nuances of particular
words and providing expert advice on language, and judges and practitioners
experienced in the practical effect of the particular cast of the rules on litigation
in their matters. In many ways, the Rules Committee is a striking exception to
the adage that it is not possible to draft in committee; many meetings include
animated and productive debates about very specific questions of proposed rules.
Once the draft rules are prepared, a Regulatory Impact Assessment is prepared
and posted together with the proposed new rules on the Federal Court’s website
and distributed widely for a sixty day period of notice and comment. In some
reform projects, this is also a period of time in which representatives of the Rules
Committee hold meetings with interested members of the bar to discuss the
proposed reforms and solicit their input. The results of this consultation process
sometimes give rise to the need for further refinements and the process is extended.
Otherwise, the reforms are finalized and the new rules formally published.
It may be difficult to verify the precise impact of the teaching of procedure
as a required subject in the basic law degree. However, the process in Canada
of reforming the Federal Court’s rules of civil procedure demonstrates a level of
engagement with members of the profession, members of the public, and members
of the legal academy that reflects a broad understanding of procedure and the
potential for reform that would seem unlikely to exist in the absence of a good
grounding in civil procedure throughout the profession.
Rules reform is only one part of the larger process of civil justice reform in
Canada. Two other kinds of civil justice reform warrant mention for the way in
which they evince a continuing and productive exchange between the profession
and the academy. The first kind of reform is one in which a perceived need for
change in the profession prompts a dialogue with legal educators about the law
school curriculum. As was noted in the earlier discussions of the accreditation of
US and Canadian law schools in Part I of this article, there is no ongoing process
of setting and monitoring compliance with detailed standards for legal education in
Canada. However, from time to time, as with the emergence of a need to improve
the availability of alternative forms of dispute resolution and the need to ensure
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lawyers have a solid grounding in issues of ethics and professionalism, the law
society has consulted with the law school administrators in the province to assess
the current curricular standards and, where appropriate, to encourage change. In
the absence of formal processes and standards for accreditation, this consultation
process has historically been a voluntary one, but it has fostered change.
The second kind of reform is the more comprehensive civil justice reform
project undertaken periodically upon the emergence of a demonstrated need for
change. Such projects have been completed in recent years in British Columbia,
Alberta, Ontario, and Québec. The notable feature of these projects is the broadly
based involvement of members of the profession that they feature. In contrast with
the Royal Commissions described in this article’s discussion of civil justice reform
in England and Wales, these comprehensive reforms have involved a number of
participants and engaged a range of perspectives that would only seem possible in
the context of a profession that is universally well-grounded in the basic principles
of procedure. Again, it is difficult to pinpoint the precise correlation between the
teaching of procedure and the nature of the consultation process that it brings
about. An awareness of the significance of the various issues raised and an insight
into the various options available and the impact of potential reforms, however,
would likely be possessed by more than just those with direct experience with the
aspects of procedure affected only if all members of the profession had the opportunity
to develop an appreciation of the issues as part of their basic law degree.
B. ENGLAND AND WALES: REFORM FROM ON HIGH AND FROM OUTSIDE65

In England and Wales, the civil justice system is regulated at two levels. The
administration of justice and jurisdictional structure more broadly is to be found
in a series of Acts of Parliament.66 The more detailed rules of court are contained
in a series of Statutory Instruments, written by statutory Rules Committees.
Procedural rule-making in England and Wales has been, at least since 1833,
the preserve of the judiciary.67 The power to make the rules is today granted by
65. Andrew Higgins took the lead in preparing this section.
66. See e.g. the Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK), c 54, s 1- 2; County Courts Act 1984 (UK), c 28, s 1;
Civil Procedure Act 1997 (UK) c 12, s 1. The Civil Procedure Act 1997 brought in the reforms
recommended by the Woolf Report. See also Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (UK), c 4.
67. The Civil Procedure Act 1833 “authori[zed] eight of the Common Law judges to make rules
for the reform of pleading.” See William Hazlitt Smith, “Rule-Making Authority,” Book
Review of The Rule-Making Authority in the English Supreme Court by Samuel Rosenbaum
(1917) 3:1 Cornell LQ 28 at 28. Sir Jack Jacob has stated:
These rule-making powers were first conferred in 1833 on the Judges of the Superior Common Law Courts in relation to pleadings only, but of course, since then, the powers have been
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act of Parliament to a committee whose membership includes the Head and
Deputy Head of Civil Justice; two or three judges of the Senior Courts; a Circuit
Judge; one or two district judges; a Master; three persons with Senior Courts
qualification, including one with experience of practice in county courts; three
persons authorized to conduct litigation in the Senior Courts, including one with
experience of practice in county courts; and two persons with experience in and
knowledge of the lay advice sector or consumer affairs.68
The extent to which the making of procedural rules is mostly left to the
judiciary and legal professional classes in England and Wales has been considered
by many to be one of the fundamental features of the English civil justice system.
Indeed, the preponderant importance the judiciary has in determining the content
of the entire field of civil procedure has historically placed England and Wales
far apart from their European neighbours and their transatlantic interlocutors. The
American academic Samuel Rosenbaum’s description of the history and mechanisms
of English rule-making in his 1917 book on rule-making69 was referred to in the
United States mostly in order to bolster the case for the Rules Enabling Act mechanism
of creating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure70 in opposition to unwieldy codes of
procedure written directly by the legislature.
In England itself, many of the reforms to the court systems introduced during
the nineteenth century were partly71 the result of a self-conscious emulation or
comparison with the all-encompassing, theory-heavy legal systems of other European

considerably extended to the whole of practice and procedure and other specified proceedings
and branches of the law and to all courts and tribunals. Such extension began with the Supreme
Court when it was created by the Judicature Acts 1873 and 1875. The Rules of Court so made
relating to all courts and tribunals thus comprise an authoritative, extensive and wide-ranging
corpus or body of civil procedural law, which to some extent may be regarded as the English
equivalent of much of what is contained in the European Codes of Civil Procedure.

68.
69.
70.
71.

Jack IH Jacob, The Fabric of English Civil Justice (London, UK: Stevens & Sons, 1987) at 53
[citations omitted].
Civil Procedure Act 1997, supra note 66, s 2.
See Smith, supra note 67.
Clarke B Whittier, “Regulating Procedure by Rules of Court” (1927) 11:1 J Am Judicature
Soc’y 15.
Some interesting rhetorical references to other nations appear in Lord Brougham’s 1828
speech. See Henry Brougham, “Speech on the Present State of the Law. Delivered in the
House of Commons, February 7, 1828, Volume 2” in Speeches of Henry Lord Brougham,
Upon Questions Relating to Public Rights, Duties, and Interests; With Historical Introductions,
and a Critical Dissertation Upon the Eloquence of the Ancients (1838) (Edinburgh: A & C
Black, 1838) 302 at 412-13.
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nations. The reforms insisted on theorizing and rationalizing civil procedure (and
other fields of law) and had academically-founded, legislative rule-making at their
heart. Although it is now conventional to ascribe the reforms of the nineteenth
century to the “theoretical spark”72 provided by the philosopher Jeremy Bentham,
who did indeed seek rationalization and simplification of the law, his vast influence
was mostly indirectly exercised and only ever acknowledged post facto. Sir Jack Jacob
himself, in a speech premised upon “the growing acceptance of civil procedural law
as a subject for academic study and research,”73 emphasized that civil procedure “is
par excellence a subject of practical importance, and precisely for this reason lawyers
ought to be in the vanguard of its reform.”74
In recent years, however, a series of constitutional reforms has led to a partial
reconsideration of the power to make rules of civil procedure: “The Civil Procedure
Act 1997 (CPA 1997), and more recently the Constitutional Reform Act 2005,
sought to regulate rule making in procedure and place it on a sounder statutory
basis.”75 Thus “the CPR are delegated legislation, made by the CPRC under the
authority conferred by the CPA 1997, ss.1 and 2. … Rules made by the CPRC
must be submitted to the Lord Chancellor, who may allow, disallow or alter rules
so made.”76 The most notable absence in the statutory provision for a standing
committee devoted to the review and amendment of the rules of civil procedure
is that of academics in the field. On occasion, individual academics may be heard
pursuant to the Civil Procedure Act, which requires that the CPRC “consult such
persons as they consider appropriate.”77 But this is not a regular occurrence. It is
far more common for the Rules Committee to respond to judicial comments in
published judgments about specific rules and their consequences. In some cases,78
72. Sir Jack IH Jacob, The Reform of Civil Procedural Law (London, UK: Sweet & Maxwell,
1982) at 207.
73. Ibid at 1.
74. Ibid at 4.
75. Adrian Zuckerman, “Rule making and precedent under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998—
still an unsettled field” (2010) 29:1 CJQ 1 at 2.
76. Ibid.
77. Civil Procedure Act 1997, supra note 66, s 2(6).
78. See e.g. Hodgson and Others v Imperial Tobacco Ltd, [1998] 1 WLR 1056 at 1069, All ER
673 (CA), citing Sir Jack Jacob as the presumed author of a note in The Supreme Court
Practice; A, B and Others v Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust In the Matter of the Nationwide
Organ Group Litigation, [2003] EWHC 1034 at para 7, 3 Costs LR 405 (QB), citing work
by Professor Adrian Zuckerman referred to in the Woolf Report; Leigh v Michelin Tyre Plc,
[2003] EWCA Civ 1766, [2004] 1 WLR 846 at para 24, citing an article by Professor John
Peysner on cost estimates. See also the discussion of a point made in Professor Zuckerman’s
2003 book on civil procedure in Akram v Adam [2004] EWCA Civ 1601, [2005] 1 WLR
2762 paras 37-43; Adrian AS Zuckerman, Civil Procedure (London, UK: LexisNexis, 2003).
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references that are made in argument to a commentator’s note may lead to
judicial discussion.
Procedural reform in England, in actual fact, does not take place for the
most part through the day-to-day changes in individual rules or blocks of rules
by the Rules Committee. Writing in 1974, Sir Jack Jacob identified a pattern
that has guided virtually every effort at reform of civil justice and procedure
from the nineteenth century to his day:
[W]hen sufficient interest or pressure was aroused for changes to be made and could no
longer be stemmed, the government of the day would decline to form its own political
judgment as to whether any and if so what reforms should be made. Such a question
would be removed from the area of party politics; and the government would profess to
be interested but neutral about the problems of change. It would accordingly set up a
commission or committee consisting mainly of judges and of members of the legal profession, with an occasional sprinkling of lay members, to enquire into the problem, and
to make recommendations as to what changes were necessary or desirable, with terms
of reference which were generally limited, though quite often implicitly containing a hint or two as to the general direction of change. The commission or committee
would take “evidence” from interested bodies and persons, and then publish its report
with its recommendations for changes to be made. The government of the day would
consider the report and its recommendations, and would adopt or adapt such of them as
it thought fit and would implement such recommendations by proposing the necessary
legislation in the form of statute or statutory Rules of Court. Thereafter a pause would
ensue, as though the legal profession and the system of civil justice required to absorb
the new changes and adapt themselves to the new conditions. The pattern has thus been,
commission or committee – report and recommendations – legislation – pause. Almost
every single change made since 1800 to this day in the organisation of the civil courts
and in civil procedure has followed this pattern.79

Royal Commissions can be defined as “ad hoc independent committees,
appointed by the government—ostensibly by the monarch—for a specific
investigatory and/or advisory purpose. After they report, any further action
must be taken by the Executive or Parliament.”80 They are variously praised for
having “significant effect on the outcome of the policy-making process,” and
criticized for being “essentially undemocratic regardless of their outcomes.”81
79. J Jacob, ‘Civil Procedure since 1800’ in The Reform of Civil Procedural Law (London, Sweet
& Maxwell 1982) at 209.
80. Barbara Lauriat, “The Examination of Everything: Royal Commissions in British Legal
History” (2010) 31:1 Stat L Rev 24 at 25. According to Lauriat, the zenith of Royal
Commissions “corresponded with a period when utilitarian, rationalistic ideals of law reform
prevailed” (ibid at 27).
81. TJ Cartwright, Royal Commissions and Departmental Committees in Britain: A Case-Study
in Institutional Adaptiveness and Public Participation in Government (London, UK: Hodder
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This method of proceeding has continued to be used uninterruptedly to the
present day with regard to the reform of civil procedure,82 with the Woolf Report83
and Jackson’s recent review of civil litigation costs.84 This may be due in part to the
absence of a permanent review body concerned with civil procedure on a level more
general than the necessarily technical approach taken by the Rules Committee. In turn,
reform by episodic “commission – report and recommendation – legislation” steps
leads to a consequently uneven opportunity for relevant academic analysis and input
into the process. Indeed, a blunt comparison of the introductions to Lord Woolf’s
and Lord Justice Jackson’s respective reports demonstrates the vast differences between
approaches, interest, or desire to acquire an academic perspective into the problem at
hand, and even the differences in the personality of these judges. Both conducted long,
though eventually limited, consultation exercises in England and other jurisdictions.
Lord Woolf specifically relied on work done by academics, including an international
conference held in Florence.85 Lord Justice Jackson, who had participated in Lord
Woolf’s survey, resorted to an international fact-finding tour in which a Task Force
travelled the world in search of insight from abroad. Additionally, he had meetings
and follow-up correspondence with a number of important academics in the field
and relied on work done at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at Oxford.86 He relied
particularly on empirical and law and economics research (much, though not all, of it
transatlantic) relating to the different costs rules and litigant behaviour.87
The different style of research and evidence gathering (and, consequently, outlook)
demonstrates the major failing with this type of reformist endeavour. The research, and
the scope of the enquiry, is necessarily piece-meal and dependent on the individual in
charge. Neither judge, in short, was able to take advantage of the breadth of research
and continuous analysis that, say, the Law Commission could provide. The Law
Commission was created in 1965 as an independent statutory body “to keep the law
under review and to recommend reform where it is needed.”88 Whether by inattention
or by design (possibly because it was convinced that the Rules Committee would fulfill

82.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

& Stoughton, 1975) at 3; AP Herbert “Anything but Action” in Ralph Harris, ed, Radical
Reaction: Essays in Competition and Affluence (London, UK: Hutchinson, 1961), cited in
Lauriat, supra note 80 at 35.
Sometimes Commissions whose terms of reference did not comprise civil procedure saw fit
to recommend the immediate establishment of commissions dedicated to that goal. See JA
Jolowicz, “‘General Ideas’ and the Reform of Civil Procedure” (1983) 3:3 LS 295 at 295.
Woolf, supra note 33.
Jackson, supra note 34.
Woolf, supra note 33, Introduction.
Jackson, supra note 34 at 6-7, 101, 344-45, 347.
Ibid at 499-502.
Law Commission, Home, online: <http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/index.htm>.
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that function with regards to civil procedure), the Law Commission did not decide,
upon its inception, to deal with civil procedure.89
However, partly to remedy this omission, the Civil Justice Council was established
under the Civil Procedure Act 1997.90 It is an advisory body sponsored by the Judicial
Office whose functions include “keeping the civil justice system under review,
considering how to make the civil justice system more accessible, fair and efficient,
advising the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary on the development of the civil justice
system, referring proposals for changes in the civil justice system to the Lord Chancellor
and the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, and making proposals for research.”91 And
while the statutorily required composition mirrors that of the Rules Committee, two
of its members as of 2011 (term expiry in January and April 2012) were professors of
law (respectively with expertise in class actions and in socio-legal research) in prestigious
UK universities. There is much to be hoped for from the coming of age of the Civil
Justice Council as a possible substitute or alternative to Law Commissions or permanent
advisory bodies in other jurisdictions. Professor John Anthony Jolowicz has identified
as one of the causes of popular dissatisfaction with the administration of justice “the
lack of general ideas or legal philosophy, so characteristic of Anglo-American law, which
gives us petty tinkering where comprehensive reform is needed.”92 In order to have
great ideas it is necessary to have an informed knowledge of the totality of the field. A
continuous, consistent review of the law surely is the best way of achieving such a result.
C. THE UNITED STATES: A MODEL OF CONTINUOUS ENGAGEMENT93

This section is about those processes of civil justice reform in the United States in
which the author of this section happens to have been significantly involved. About
six decades ago, Chief Justice Arthur Vanderbilt of New Jersey observed that civil
justice reform is “no sport for the short-winded.”94 The author wholeheartedly agrees
with this observation.

89. This was apparently a “great disappointment” to Sir Jack Jacob. See “Sir Jack Jacob Q.C.
1908–2000” (2001) 20 CJQ 79 at 79.
90. Civil Procedure Act 1997, supra note 66.
91. Ibid, s 6.
92. Jolowicz, supra note 82 at 298.
93. Thomas D Rowe Jr took the lead in preparing this section.
94. Arthur T Vanderbilt, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration: A survey of the extent to
which the standards of the American Bar Association for improving the administration of justice
have been accepted throughout the country (New York: Law Centre of New York University for
the National Conference of Judicial Councils, 1949) at xix.
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1.

THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS AND RULE-MAKING: THE
ROLE OF CONGRESS

Given American federalism, civil justice reform takes place by many means. It
can vary of course from time to time, but also considerably from state to state.
In some states such as Florida, for example, the state constitution as written or
judicially interpreted imposes significant separation-of-powers limits on the state
legislature’s authority to make rules for state courts.95 By contrast, in New York
and California the legislatures have long been unquestionably involved in writing
state procedure codes such as the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules96 and the
California Code of Civil Procedure.97
Looking at the federal court system, Congress is the metaphorical eight
hundred-pound gorilla of changes in federal court jurisdiction and procedure.98 It
exercises virtually sole power to determine the jurisdiction of federal courts. It does
so sporadically, as it did when it expanded federal courts’ jurisdiction over state-law class
actions in the Class Action Fairness Act of 200599—an ideologically-contested action,
but one of unquestioned constitutionality as far as the author of this section knows.
Additionally, it also dictates procedure in the federal courts, as it did when it stiffened
pleading standards for some securities-fraud class actions in the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act100 of 1995, which also dealt with substance and jurisdiction.
Congress can also engage in episodic efforts to determine the jurisdiction of federal
courts. One example of such an effort is the Congressionally-created Federal Courts
Study Committee of 1989–1990, which produced numerous recommendations,101
some of which Congress enacted into law.102
95. See e.g. Jeffrey A Parness, “Public Process and State-Court Rulemaking,” (1979) 88:6 Yale LJ
at 1319.
96. NY CPLR (McKinney 2013).
97. Cal Civ Proc (West 2013).
98. See e.g. Hanna v Plumer, 380 US 465 (1965). In this case the US Supreme Court stated that
“the constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and
Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and
pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though
falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of
classification as either” (ibid at 472). For the Necessary and Proper Clause, see US Const art I
§ 8, cl 18.
99. Pub L No 109-2, 119 Stat 4 (codified in 28 USC).
100. Pub L No 104-67 109 Stat 737 (codified in 15 USC).
101. See US Department of Justice, Federal Courts Study Committee, Report of the Federal Courts
Study Committee (April 1990), online: Federal Judicial Center <https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/Digitization/124270NCJRS.pdf>.
102. Pub L No 101-650 104 Stat 5113 (codified in 28 USC).
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2.

THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS AND RULE-MAKING:
THE RULES ENABLING ACT PROCESS

Congressional action with respect to matters of more or less pure procedure in the
federal courts is not frequent (although threatened in recent years perhaps more often
than in the past). Congress has delegated the lead role in making and amending
procedural rules for the federal courts to the United States Supreme Court (USSC),
which acts based on recommendations from a pyramid of advisory groups. Five
Advisory Committees—on rules of Appellate Procedure, Bankruptcy Procedure,
Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence—generate recommendations
that are vetted by both an umbrella Standing Committee and public comment and
hearings. The Advisory and Standing Committees are appointed by the Chief Justice
of the United States and consist of a majority of federal judges with representatives
from the practising bar, academia, the federal Department of Justice, and the state
courts. They are served by non-voting Reporters, invariably academics, who are in
charge of preparing draft proposals and commentary thereon.
When they are finally approved by the Standing Committee, recommendations of
Advisory Committees are considered by the Judicial Conference of the United States,
the formal organization of the federal judiciary with representatives from the federal
appellate and trial courts.103 If approved by the Judicial Conference, recommended
rule changes go before the USSC, which usually but not always adopts them; they
take effect some months afterward if not vetoed, stayed, or changed by Act of
Congress.104 So the process involves the USSC acting in a legislative role under
a delegation of power from Congress. A possibly significant limit on this rulemaking power is that under the Rules Enabling Act, the rules adopted by the USSC
may not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”105 Congress itself is
under no such limit, since its powers (even though not plenary) include legislating
with respect to both procedure and substance. While the USSC has never given
significant teeth to the substantive-rights limit on the rule-making process, the
rule makers themselves are mindful of it.
The process just described is lengthy but transparent, with considerable input
from interest groups and individual practitioners, academics, and judges.106 The
103. See 28 USC § 331 (2006). This statute establishes the Judicial Conference and enumerates
its powers and duties.
104. For a fuller description of the process for amending Federal Rules, see James C Duff,
“A Summary for the Bench and Bar” (2010), online: <http://www.uscourts.gov/
RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess/SummaryBenchBar.aspx>.
105. 28 USC § 2072(b) (2006).
106. Indeed, the length of the process means that sometimes when a minor mistake has
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process is regularized and ongoing, with greater activity at some times than others,
but not highly sporadic. It is somewhat politicized but less so than when Congress
becomes involved, and more politicized than it was some decades ago. As a member
of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules from 1993 to 1999, the author of this
section was impressed with the process (although not always agreeing with its
outcomes), while being struck and somewhat surprised by the level of discontent
in the civil procedure academy about the process and its product. Impetus for
rule amendments comes from varied sources: the Advisory Committee’s own
considerations, academic scholarship, and suggestions by individual judges and
practitioners. Congress decides not to proceed on suggestions (which are often
trivial, bad, or biased) at a fairly high rate, but significant responses to problems
large or small are still perceived as genuine.
3.

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN THE RULE-MAKING PROCESS

One significant factor bearing on American federal civil justice reform is empirical
work. The Rules Committees sometimes commission empirical studies of both
patterns in litigated cases in areas regarded as being of concern, and of effects of
recent revisions. The Research Division of the Federal Judicial Center, the education
and research arm of the federal judiciary, is one significant source of such research.
Another is the Institute for Civil Justice of the RAND Corporation, an independent
think tank. In general, empirical legal studies—including studies of procedural
matters—is an area of increasing focus for legal academia and for non-legal
academics interested in the legal system.107 Not all rule revisions are based on
empirical research or subjected to empirical evaluation, but empirical work does
play a significant part.
4.

OTHER INPUTS TO CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES

Again, American civil justice reform is highly multifaceted. Many other bodies such as
the American Law Institute (a law-reform organization that consists of practitioners,
judges, and academics and that is not limited to civil-justice matters)108 and the
American College of Trial Lawyers (an organization of experienced litigators)109
been made, it is easier to fix it by getting a bill through Congress than by processing a
recommendation for amendment to the USSC.
107. See e.g. the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, launched in 2004.
108. See American Law Institute, “Overview,” online: <http://www.ali.org/index.
cfm?fuseaction=about.overview>.
109. See American College of Trial Lawyers, “President’s Message,” online: <http://www.actl.com//
AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home>.

WALKER ET AL., THOUGHTFUL PRACTITIONERS 193

generate law-reform proposals. Some of these proposals are influential in actual rule
or statutory reform while others may influence judicial decisions without being
enacted into positive law. Other bodies proposing civil justice reforms include the
Sedona Conference,110 which produces proposals for best practices concerning
preservation and discovery of electronically stored information. Bar groups are also
active in generating studies and recommendations on procedural and other legal
topics; the ABA takes positions on a considerable range of matters, for example.
And the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, to mention just one other
example, has a long-standing reputation for careful, relatively disinterested study
of problem areas and possible reforms.
5.

PARTICIPATION IN CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM BY SECTORS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION

Stepping back from particulars about sources of procedural reform efforts, a
common characteristic of such efforts in the United States is that they tend
to involve considerable participation by all major legal sectors, including the
practising bar, the bench, and the academy. In particular, the scribes—those
generating draft proposals and explanatory material—are usually academics. The
bodies passing on the recommendations usually have large majorities of practitioners
and judges, although professors are sometimes also voting members of these groups.
The actual adoption of proposed reforms, of course, is by governmental bodies
such as the federal Congress, state legislatures, or courts acting in legislative roles
usually under power delegated by the legislative branch, but in some states inherent
or constitutionally conferred authority.
D. AUSTRALIA: REFORM OF THE RULES VERSUS REFORM OF THE CIVIL
JUSTICE SYSTEM—A STUDY IN CONTRASTS111

The experience in Australia has highlighted the distinction between the reform of
the rules of civil litigation and the reform of the civil justice system as a whole.
Civil procedural reform in Australia has rarely been contentious. Most of its
two-century history has been one of incremental change controlled by the courts
through their rule-making powers, often transplanting procedural changes from
elsewhere. Major revisions of the rules of the court have not been undertaken
lightly and rules of court have often remained largely unchanged for three or four
decades at a time. However, recent years have seen more reform. The Federal Court

110. Online: <http://www.thesedonaconference.org/>.
111. David Bamford took the lead in preparing this section.
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Rules 1979 were replaced by the Federal Court Rules 2011.112 The South Australian
Supreme Court Rules 1947 were replaced with the Supreme Court Rules 1987 and
more recently by the 2006 Supreme Court Rules.113 The New South Wales Supreme
Court Rules 1970 were repealed in large measure by the Uniform Civil Procedure
Rules 2005.114 And the Victoria Supreme Court Rules 1986 were replaced by the
Supreme Court Rules 2010.115
For Australia, the question of the relationship between the teaching of civil
procedure and civil justice reform is difficult to ascertain. While the evolution of
civil procedure as an academic discipline has been discussed in other articles in
this issue,116 the process of civil justice reform, and particularly civil procedure
reform, is much less clear.
Across the nine Australian jurisdictions, with few exceptions, the process of
regular review and updating of civil procedure is opaque. Most procedural reform
is accomplished through amendments to civil procedure rules, punctuated
infrequently with major revisions of the rules. Unlike the processes in Canada
and the United States, these amendments are largely the result of the work of
small groups, overwhelmingly comprised of judges, who usually deliberate among
themselves without public consultation. There are two models for procedural
reform operating in Australia. In the first, the legislation that establishes the
court empowers the judges of the court to make rules governing the practice
and procedure of the courts. This is the case, for example, in the Federal Court
of Australia, and the Supreme Courts of South Australia, Victoria, and Western
Australia.117 In most cases, the legislation provides that rules changes require the
support of the majority of the judges, although in South Australia it provides that
any three or more judges are authorized to make procedural rules.
In the second model, the legislation establishes a Rules Committee with
broader representation. New South Wales and Queensland have adopted this
model, although in Queensland the rule-making power is vested in the Governor
in Council upon recommendation by its Rules Committee. Both New South Wales
and Queensland have adopted uniform rules of civil procedure for all levels of
courts of general civil jurisdiction and their Rules Committees have representatives
from the various courts. New South Wales also includes two legal practitioners
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), s 1.03.
Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA), s 1.07; Supreme Court Rules 2006 (SA), s 7.
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).
Supreme Court Rules 2010 (Vic), s 1.
See supra note 1.
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 59; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 72; Supreme
Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 26; Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 168.
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in its Supreme Court Rules Committee that co-exists with its Uniform Rules
Committee. The legislation in Tasmania also provides for a rules committee that
includes four legal practitioners, although the formal power to make rules is vested
in the Supreme Court judges. Like Queensland, the judges are constrained by the
legislative requirement that any rules proposed by the judges must be recommended
by the Rules Committee.
From a practical perspective, the difference between the two models is not
great. Even where rules can be made only on the recommendation of a Rules
Committee, the lay members of all existing Rules Committees are significantly
outnumbered by judicial and court officials. Furthermore, most of the courts with
no legislative requirement for a Rules Committee have, in fact, created advisory
Rules Committees that include representatives from the practising profession,
and occasionally departmental officials. South Australia has the Joint Rules
Advisory Committee for example, and each of the Victorian courts has created
advisory committees.118
The work of procedural reform, whether undertaken by these committees or
the judges themselves, is done largely in private. The process is not confidential per
se, but the procedures, agenda, deliberations, and membership of the committees is
either not publicly available or it is not easily accessed. Many practitioners learn of
procedural amendments only upon implementation of the amendments.
It is clear from this description of the processes for procedural reform that there
is little scope or role for academics specializing in civil procedure. Given the limited
role of the practising profession, it is hardly surprising that no provision is made for
academic involvement. This is not a criticism of the courts. Until recently there has
not been strong academic engagement in the field of civil procedure more generally.
Most law schools employed practitioners to teach civil procedure and only in the last
fifteen years has there been a real growth in academic interest in the field.
However, the process described above reflects the ordinary incremental reform
of procedure. In the last twenty years, the widespread perception of the need for
urgent reform has led to major reviews of civil procedure with completely fresh
procedural rules emerging as a result. These initiatives have often originated outside
the courts, and have been advanced by legislatures or government departments, often
as part of a broad law reform process. In Queensland, the government created a
Litigation Reform Commission in the early 1990s, the Western Australia government
asked its Law Reform Commission to review criminal and civil justice in 1997,
118. Victorian Law Reform Commission, Civil Justice Review Report (Melbourne: Victorian Law
Reform Commission, 2008) at 698-700, online: <http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/sites/
default/files/VLRC%2BCivil%2BJustice%2BReview%2B-%2BReport.pdf>.
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the Commonwealth government asked the Australian Law Reform Commission
to conduct an inquiry into the federal civil justice system in the late 1990s, the
New South Wales government created a Uniform Rules Working Party in the
early 2000s, and the Victorian Government asked the Victorian Law Reform
Commission to conduct a review of civil justice in 2006.
The process these inquiries adopted was generally very similar. Researchers were
appointed or engaged, public submissions were sought and encouraged, discussion
papers or proposals were developed, wide consultation on the proposals took
place, sometimes major conferences were organised, and eventually a report with
proposed reforms was provided to the government.119 This afforded considerable
opportunity for civil procedure academics to contribute to the formulation of
the proposals for reform. In many cases the commissioners of the relevant law
reform commission included legal academics and, in the case of the Australian
Law Reform Commission Inquiry, much reliance was placed on research by legal
academics into procedural law and practice. With the most recent Victorian Law
Reform Commission review, a leading practitioner turned academic, Professor Peter
Cashman, was appointed to head the review. In this way, although the reform of
particular procedures in the litigation process has traditionally been seen as within
the purview of the courts themselves, the reform of the civil justice system as a
whole has involved much more broadly based initiatives.
There is a further way in which procedural scholars have contributed to the
process of civil justice reform—through their involvement with independent
research centres. However, the success of research centres focusing on courts
and their processes has been inconsistent. Organizations such as the Australian
Institute of Judicial Administration (AIJA) have active research agendas that
promote academic research into justice issues including procedural reform. For
a long time hosted by the University of Melbourne, the AIJA has recently moved
to Monash University. In New South Wales, the Civil Justice Research Centre did
excellent work in the 1990s, but lost its main funding in the early 2000s. The Law
and Justice Foundation in New South Wales has continued to promote research
into justice issues more broadly. The University of Wollongong Centre for Court
Policy and Administration provided graduate courses in court administration and
promoted research until it closed around 2000. However, all these bodies provided
avenues for academic research into civil procedure, which was regularly relied upon
by the various Law Reform Commission inquiries.
119. For details of the process, see e.g. Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A
Review of the Federal Civil Justice System (ALRC Report 8) (February 2000) at 63-64, online:
<http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/ALRC89.pdf>.

WALKER ET AL., THOUGHTFUL PRACTITIONERS 197

The foregoing description of academic involvement in procedural reform
raises questions about its overall impact. It would appear that the direct input of
academics into procedural reform is largely limited to episodic involvement in
major public reviews of litigation occurring outside the normal rule-making process.
Is this, then, the true extent of the impact of teaching procedure on civil justice
reform in Australia? Perhaps it is not. Although it is a long term consideration, it
is reasonable to anticipate that the procedural issues and values considered in law
schools will come to influence the thinking of the next generation of judges, and
thus the rule makers of the future. It is to be hoped that instilling in these next
generation judges the notion that good procedure enables courts to deliver their
important public functions with integrity and legitimacy in an evolving world
of social regulation, and dispute resolution will help to ensure that they will be
motivated and equipped to adapt procedure to meet the challenges of the future.
And, to the extent that the process of reform comes to involve a larger sector of
the profession, it is to be hoped that they will be similarly motivated and equipped
to contribute.

III. CONCLUSION
Does the approach taken to the teaching and learning of procedure influence the
way in which practising lawyers conceive of their professions and their need to be
mindful of how it might best function to serve the interests of the public? Does
the expectation that all new members of the profession will engage with core
procedural values by acquiring an academic grounding in the law help to ensure
that they will be more thoughtful practitioners? Does it make them more mindful
of the need to seek ways to maintain public confidence in the legal profession and
so to justify preserving its status as a self-regulated profession?
Moreover, does the approach taken to the teaching and learning of procedure
influence the way in which civil justice reform is pursued? Does the widespread
engagement of law students with core procedural values in an academic setting
support a more continuous and broadly-based engagement with the challenges
of civil justice reform?
These are complex questions to be sure and they do not readily admit of
answers that can be verified in a statistically measurable fashion. Nevertheless,
the combined effect of the reflections of the authors of this article has provided a
compelling account of the links that might be drawn between the academic study
of procedure and an engaged legal community committed to serving the interests of
the public. It remains to be seen whether such links might be recognized by those
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responsible for determining the relationship between the study of procedure and
admission to the profession, and those responsible for determining the subjects
regarded as appropriate for the academic study of law.
To the extent that such a link may appropriately be drawn, the two topics
considered in this article—the state of the profession and civil justice reform—might
warrant further reflection in the reverse order. Recognizing the means for ensuring
that the profession continues to provide leadership in the pursuit of reform in times
of changing needs in the larger community may be critical for those who value
the practice of law as a self-regulated profession to maintain public confidence
in the profession, and with it the foundation for support for self-regulation. We
hope that these articles will make a contribution to further discussions of these
important issues.

